

THE BULGARIAN SCHOOL AND THE NOTION OF EUROPE

**Analysis of the Bulgarian high-school
textbooks in history**

Balkan Colleges Foundation, Sofia, 1999

All rights reserved. This publication may not be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publishers.

THE BULGARIAN SCHOOL
AND THE NOTION OF EUROPE

Analysis of the Bulgarian high-school textbooks in history

© Balkan Colleges Foundation, 1999

© Dimana Ilieva, Translator, 1999

ISBN 954-90302-3-7

THE BULGARIAN SCHOOL AND THE NOTION OF EUROPE

Analysis of the Bulgarian high-school textbooks in history

This survey, prepared by Milena Yakimova, Nina Nikolova and Svetlana Subeva, contains the results gained in the frames of a research project carried out by the Balkan Colleges Foundation and financed under the MATRA Small Embassy Projects Programme (MATRA KAP Programme) of the Embassy of The Kingdom of The Netherlands to Bulgaria.

INTRODUCTION

Published about three years ago was the first survey on the history textbooks from the Balkan countries; it was carried out by the Balkan Colleges Foundation and the results came out in a book entitled "The Image of the Other." Unfortunately, the issue of our notions about the neighbour has lost nothing of its sharpness and I am convinced that it will continue to be the focus of much future work. Today, however, at the brink of the new millennium - and especially after the European Union has started to expand south-eastward - it is perhaps even more important for us to clarify another of our notions, that of Europe. So if the politicians and the diplomats have been given credit to find Bulgaria's place in our collective European home, the mission to build a modern European identity among the younger generations has been entrusted to the educational system and, first of all, to the teachers.

"The Notion of Europe" is not an examination of the textbook messages. In one form or another, more successfully or less so, the European horizon is there. What "The Notion of Europe" deals with are the mediators and the recipients of that message. Here is an examination of the "dialogue" between the teacher and the textbook, the teacher and the student, the history programme as a whole and the factors it must interact with, run along with, sometimes even fight with - from the jokes and the anecdotes, the media and the rumours, the programme in other key subjects for the students frame of mind, such as literature, up to the ultimate and most crucial conflict: That within the teachers themselves.

The survey, carried out by a joint team of historians and sociologists, was based on a content analysis of the history textbooks and the general programme in history. The applied procedure was qualitative for the teachers who were approached in focus groups, and combined for the students. The present publication draws on the final report for the survey; all content analyses are available at the BCF. In all likelihood, the teachers are still in their schools. Some of the students have enrolled in different universities (some maybe in Europe). Others may also have continued their studies but are still here, having remained in "the other Europe," as they call it. What we are left with is the effort to join "this" Europe with "that," "our" with "their" until they are so mixed together that no one could remember what was where.

Tzvetan Tzvetanski

Part I

THE TEACHERS

EUROPE AND ITS SHADOW IN THE MINDS OF THE BULGARIAN HISTORY TEACHERS

(based on focus groups consisting of high-school history teachers)

1. The Applied Methodology

Our objective has been to register whether there exist - and if so, in what form they are manifested - certain discrepancies, contradictions or tensions between the different levels of knowledge (in the teacher's capacities as a citizen, as an expert in history and as an educator), how they are resolved and, ultimately, how the European or non-European identity of the Bulgarian teacher is constituted. That background self-perception or background knowledge which supplies the teachers' civic visions with flesh and body - and which, although it most likely remains unarticulated in front of the students, still pervades and "colours" the entire educational discourse, - largely determines in what manner and to what extent the global objective set before the instruction in history over the last decade can be attained ("the Bulgarian history should be framed as an organic part of the European history" - cf. *The Methodological Guidelines of the Ministry of Education*).

To this end, our questionnaire was tentatively divided in two. The questions included in the first part were directed at topics from the field of the media and the general discussional backdrop of the "Europe" theme. We presumed that even if they could distance themselves from the journalists, the teachers would still primarily respond as citizens, however better-educated historically; and that they would project their private visions on the political order of the world. Our first three questions were aimed at making the participants conceive Europe as such, in itself, incongruent with the Bulgarian outlook; and possibly place it among the other centres (the American, the Asian) of the global world in terms both of the political and the cultural. As it shall become clear later on - and contrary to our expectations, this proved to be an exceptionally difficult task as the matter in question was almost immediately substituted with another issue, that of "we, the Bulgarians (or rather the Bulgarian history), versus Europe." Therefore we decided "in passing" to slip in an associative test of a kind ("What is the first thing that comes to your mind when you hear the word *Europe*?"), supposed to evoke a much freer and less "committed" handling of the subject. The next set of questions in this section requested to rationalize the divisions that covertly or overtly cut through present-day Europe, shaping a multitude of collective identities (within Schengen and without; the Roman-German world and that of Slavdom; Catholicism, Protestantism, Eastern Orthodoxy, etc.). Here our hypothesis was that through the above divisions we would be able to outline that broader collective identity which today mediates the Bulgarian place in Europe (Slavdom, Eastern Orthodoxy, Byzantium and the

Byzantine civilization, the former COMECON, the Balkans, etc.). The conclusion can be made in advance that in the teachers' minds such a broader collective identity to encompass us all as being Bulgarian seems to be almost missing; while insofar as it is "the Balkans," they are merely something that makes us different from Europe without furnishing us with sufficiently distinct, "compact" features. It was only then that the final series of questions introduced the topic of the relation between "the Bulgarian history and Europe" - a series that, as it was already mentioned earlier, in many cases proved to be the overwhelming topic despite the moderator's efforts.

In this first section, an unusual procedure was included along with the standard "question - answer" technique: the participants in each discussion were asked to put collectively together an improvised portrait of Europe out of various photographic materials, selected beforehand by the survey team. Most interesting for our purpose proved not so much the produced collages as the comments during the process of their arrangement. While arguing how to classify certain items (personalities, symbols, situations) - as European or non-European, and how to define the relation between them (e.g. Napoleon, the guillotine and the image recognized to represent the Congress in Vienna, in one of the discussions were viewed as the "symbolic series" of violence; Marx, Lenin and Gorbachev were similarly believed to go together as "they started all the mess," etc.), or what should be set "at the centre" (once it was Napoleon as the symbol of the *"first European unification, albeit achieved by force"*; on another occasion it was the Pope), the participants demonstrated the pre-discursive historical logic by which they perceive the becoming of Europe.

The second section of the questionnaire dealt with the representation of the European history in the Bulgarian textbooks and the teachers' ideas about the "European associations" of their students. Contrary to our hypothesis that the teachers would mainly criticize the textbooks, almost all discussions were dominated by the feeling of the "advantages" of the Bulgarian education set against the European and its "narrow specialization."

2. The Problem

We expected that the most significant methodological problem we would encounter during the preparation, the conduct and the analysis of the survey would be that of liberating the teachers' opinions from the "ideological garment" of their professional historical expertise; yet what we actually established was something rather peculiar (only at first glance, however). It can definitely be maintained that the teachers in fact reasoned, discussed and argued first of all as citizens. That does not readily break to surface, though, as the content comes out wrapped in the shape precisely of the professional historical discourse. On second thoughts, that is hardly accidental.

Although the beginnings of the process can be sought earlier (in the so-called reformist historical discourse, cf. Ilcho Dimitrov's history textbook of 1982), it can safely be claimed that the hidden school programme for the **Europeisation*** of the Bulgarian school was actually launched with the changes of November 10th, 1989. The image of Europe in the history programme before November 10th was negative and to a large extent consistent: it was the image of the Great Powers. Then, as the teachers say themselves: *"all of the sudden Western Europe became the paragon of the world's culture and development"* (history teacher, man, Plovdiv, Discussion 2); *"we rush now to the other ideological extreme and the image of Europe is cast very favourably in the current textbooks, nearly idealised..."* (history teacher, woman, Plovdiv, Discussion 2). Things do not finish with rewriting the programme and the textbooks, however.

Over the last decade, not only and not simply a hidden school programme but a comprehensive civic (political, social, media) programme for Europeisation has submerged Bulgaria's everyday life. Starting as a political project, "the road to Europe" has acquired, as we could term it, practical verity. Or, to put it otherwise, it has become for the common people part of their daily routine. How? It would not be exaggerated to claim that we are constantly haunted by the Europising discourse: it vibrates in the electronic media and "stares" us in the face from the front pages of the newspapers; we see it even in the Europised weather forecast or the ECU subsidies for the lower bracket families. All hardships of the Bulgarian everyday life are measured, so to say, against a European scale. Set against this background, the image of Europe takes on a new compactness, impregnated, however, with inner contradictiveness and ambivalence. Yet even this far the problem has not been fully fathomed.

The entire decade of the Bulgarian road to Europe has been marked by one critically important event. That is the political act (in fact frequently pointed out by the teachers) of the Polish, Czech and Hungarian integration in Europe (these countries being the so-called "A-students"). By doing so, that is, by the exclusion of these three countries from the Schengen list and their subsequent inclusion in NATO, Europe has performed the key symbolic gesture that disqualifies the south-eastern region and Bulgaria in particular. Up to that point, the 50-year period between WWII and the downfall of the Berlin Wall was more than successful in its role to provide a legitimate framework of interpretation and justification for the position of Bulgaria as part of Eastern Europe. Along with all other former socialist countries, Bulgaria enjoyed a reserved seat, albeit in a second-class carriage. Then the integration of the "A-students" radically changed the picture, turning things upside down. The border was suddenly pushed further and Bulgaria found itself on the Balkans. The adjective Eastern still described Europe; but the term South-Eastern Europe rang less and less fitting for the Balkans. To paraphrase I. Krustev's words: The Balkans did not have to be imagined a new,

*On the difference between the hidden and the open history programme, see *The Rewritings of the Present Bulgarian History in the High-School Textbooks*. A more detailed discussion on the topic is included in Part III of this article.*

Europe simply had to recall them.

The Balkanisation of Bulgaria sharply called into question its so far seemingly apparent Europeisation. It was then and there that the insoluble conflict between the imposition of a Balkan identity and our self-perception as Europeans was planted: *"We would rather not be identified with the Balkans because pretty often a transfer of notions is made (for instance, things are transferred from the Serbs onto the Bulgarians). We are in Europe after all. But even we invest different meanings in it sometimes good, sometimes bad. When we speak about one drag or another, we say it's done in the Balkan way. On the other hand, we feel we are discriminated a bit undeserved"* (history teacher, man, Sofia, Discussion 1). Triggered into action here seems to be the social mechanism called in sociology "self-effective prophecies." Despite the desperate resistance, despite the explication of a whole avalanche of arguments in favour of our Europeity, secretly, invisibly, the label, the brand, the stigma has become identity - a Balkan identity, that is a non-European identity, reversed and superimposed: *"We fluctuate between two great extremes of self-esteem - from that of national overvaluation, patting ourselves on the back that "we have also given something to the world, to Slavdom all its letters, books and words," down to that of national nihilism — the Bulgarian way, you know, you 'd remember Ivan Hadjiiski"* (history teacher, woman, Sofia, Discussion 2). Paradoxically, it turns out that those 50 years beyond the Iron Curtain were not enough. The historical eye had to penetrate much deeper into our past to seek resources that could render legitimate our Europeisation.

This is how the above-described situation is played out in the teachers' visions. On the one hand, *"I think we take the right view when we speak globally and mean mainly the West European Union, not Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary."* On the other hand, however, *"Up to 1939, Czechoslovakia enjoyed a higher standard than Belgium. The Czechs were practically ready. And then they were dragged 50 years back... Yet, 50 years can't change a historical tradition that goes back for centuries. Hungary has been part of the Great Powers as well. As for Poland, it is true that the country was divided... but down to the 18th century Poland was a great power in itself"* (history teacher, man, Sofia, Discussion 1). We can see how the contemporary symbolic geopolitical changes in space create the need for changes (of the symbolic places) within the historical time itself. Should this interpretative thread be followed further, to the integration of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary viewed as a sign of the separation of the Catholic West *{ "The borders now seem to be altered in line with the formation of the Catholic world, especially after the integration of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary "*-history teacher, man, Plovdiv, Discussion 2), the need of a Europising power for the historical narrative will reach even farther back in time where that power will be discovered in Bulgaria's belonging to the Orthodox Church and,

respectively, the Byzantine civilisation. By **naming*** Bulgaria "orthodox" and "part of the Byzantine civilisation," the historical discourse secretly classifies her as Christian, and by virtue of this very fact, European country. And so forth.

Hence, the historical problem called "Europe" is not repositied in the past, it is not dead and therefore objectified item of analysis. It lives here and now, its history is "being written" in the present, it is still in the process of happening. All this makes the position of the history teacher no less difficult as it is responsible. For the presentness of the problem "Europe" attracts as a lodestone or, on the contrary, drives away its past. What makes the history teacher such a key figure is that it rests with him to keep together the past, the present and the future in one coherent entity.

The paradox comes from the fact that he must teach history under the hidden programme for Europeisation as if it has already happened, which is not the case. It is just presently happening before the eyes of the Bulgarian history teacher who is expected to act not merely as an observer, but as an acolyte to its happening as well. The image of Europe becomes the focus of the painful collision between the citizen, the teacher and the educator. Yet it is precisely the civic stance that will play the lead in keeping together the coherence between the past, the present and the future. For, before it could be held out as knowledge (that is, in front of the students), it must be first held out as an opinion (that is, for the teacher him/herself.) Thus it only at first appears strange that the teachers speak primarily as citizens and phrase their opinions - corroborating them more or less convincingly – by applying their professional knowledge of history.

3. The Data

The survey identified two typical groups of history teachers. The first is smaller but its members stand out brightly enough, while the other one definitely prevails, being much more numerous. The dividing line between them is drawn by the two semantic contexts in which the "Europe" theme is conceived and which appear to be relatively homogenous. The first is based on the perception of Europe "in itself," the second - on the perception of Europe "for us, the Bulgarians." Using stricter sociological terms, the same would mean, as follows: in the former case Europe is charged with a

** It is worth remembering that "the rewritings of history...derive their origin from acts of naming renaming or depriving of a name... from the "fabrication" of agents and historical actions, periods and events through the power of words..." (D.Deyanov, The State and the Commonplaces of Memory, Archive 3-4/97).*

positive (in the logical sense) identity, i.e. its image is filled up with a more autonomous content; in the latter, Europe has a negative (in the logical sense) identity, i.e. what is said about it is always juxtaposed with our experience as Bulgarians. In which case Europe is first of all a historical complex for the Bulgarians.

To be able to think of Europe "in itself," the participants must doubtless be liberated from this "Bulgarian complex" towards Europe and the painful awareness of being under-Europised. Otherwise, they would immediately fall victim to the "screening" of that painful awareness that brings on the cliché: *"There is no need for us to get integrated in Europe or enter it as -we have always been there."* It is hardly accidental that the ability to conceive of Europe "in itself" was actually demonstrated by fewer teachers, as it has already been mentioned earlier - teachers with larger cultural resources and some experience in "European communication." Here, the implicit precondition is the speaker's self-image as a-European-after-all, as being capable of passing a judgment on the "European affairs" on a par with all other Europeans. The starting point for the verbal expositions of this type is most frequently found in the very fact of that *"unprecedented unification,"* to quote one of the participants, which is seen as a guarantee for the all-round *"superiority"* of Europe; or, in other words, that is the *"Europe of the shared goals."* Emblematic in this context are the French-German relations, marvelled at almost unfailingly with a feeling of genuine surprise (*"Over the last century Germany and France have been constantly at war but look! - now there seem to be nearly no borders between them,"* was one of the comments). Judging by the fact that Gorbachev's picture, respectively his idea for a "common European home," has not once come to the front during the arrangement of the photographic materials, it seems that the unification is regarded as a purely western accomplishment. In opposition to this model, there spontaneously emerges the image of the Balkans where *"the shared goals are not recognised"* yet, where *"the borders are at their harshest."* Respectively, the borders of Europe remain the political borders so *"Europe is in reality Western Europe"* - not Albania, neither Ukraine; and its "pillars" are the French, the Germans, the Italians.

The contrast between the two groups is further illustrated through their style of speaking and the manner in which every individual participant tackles the professional historical discourse. The liberation from the typical "Bulgarian complex" of under-Europeisation is far from simple as it permeates the everyday historical knowledge; it is insulated in multitudinous dogmas and stereotypes, which - torn out of their context and circulated on end by the media and the politicians - dominate every possible thinking of the problem called "Europe" and literally check it, shut it

in, refuse to give it free rein. Therefore, a rather specific and privileged viewpoint is required in order to permit one penetrate beyond the dogmatised and stereotyped historical knowledge. The group of teachers who try to conceive Europe "in itself" has been quite successful in overcoming the ideological discourse, while the other group - the one that stays with it - by this very act remains slave to the Bulgarian under-Europeisation complex. We shall now proceed to describe several subtypes within each group.

A. Europe "in itself"

Within the smaller group, three secondary types have become apparent: "the pragmatist," "the psychoanalyst" and "the philosopher of history."

- The Pragmatist's motto: *"Should we play the resentful kid, indignant at his undeserved punishment, we will never have the chance to send out a positive message"* (history teacher, man, Plovdiv, Discussion 2). The Pragmatist's position is based on the conviction that what is needed is to act, that the image of Bulgaria before Europe must be produced by Bulgaria itself. Moreover, Bulgaria bears to a large extent the responsibility for her image. His is a strongly committed stance, very active, and appealing for Bulgaria to learn from her history and take her future in her own hands.

- The Psychoanalyst's motto: *"There is this escapism from self-knowledge in us: what we expect from history is rather to supply us with good grounds for national pride, while in Europe, in its culture, that particular line has not been omitted"* (history teacher, man, Sofia, Discussion 2). This is a stance - and we can bravely claim so, - which attempts to call in question an entire long-established tradition in the making of history in our country (and not solely in it). History should not be written as if it would serve and be used only as a temporary tool, as if we could freely recall or forget it, should this better suit us. In order to set ourselves free from the traumatic experiences that our history is fraught with, we must disclose them in the unconscious - an act requiring "greater courage."

- The Philosopher's of History motto: *"It is our closeness that separates us, mounting new obstacles again"* (history teacher, man, Sofia, Discussion 1). The appeal of this position is to seek for the deeper causes of what comes to pass, to call things by their real names, without offence, without experiencing history as a traumatising event. This standpoint holds as a guideline some sort of

philosophical realism. We are faced with things that are thought of as being positive, and other things which appear to be negatively loaded. The point is, however, not to stop there but to make an effort to understand why that is so and what are the consequences. For instance, *"As a historian, I can't help having - to put it mildly - certain objections towards the term Europe, towards the policy of Europe, but even so we still must admit that a kind of superiority has been witnessed recently - not only in terms of the economy, which has been clearly demonstrated, but a superiority in the cultural respect, if you will. A superiority in that that they can turn their backs on some old hostilities and step ahead, towards the idea of finding a common purpose. Unfortunately, down here in the south we cannot set our common goals and start following them "* (history teacher, man, Sofia, Discussion 1).

All the above outlooks make the Bulgarian under-Europeisation seem not so much an ill lot as a matter of time and "development," of an extra push and some stronger effort to be made both on our part (*"we are a bit shy,"* or *"to make an image is no less important than what you actually are"*) and on the part of the European politicians (in this connection, for example, a new Marshall Plan is mentioned). If they have to be consistently drawn out, the civic aspects of this position would be that both in prospect and in retrospect it is Bulgaria itself that is largely accountable for her image, that the image of Bulgaria before Europe is the fruit of her own doing.

As far as the vision of the "Bulgarian history as part of the European history" is concerned, it is generally pictured in this group without pathetic sentiments and clichés.

"The Pragmatist:" *"The fact that Bulgaria has been founded as a part of Europe is definitely clear, but then Europe broke in two, one of its parts fell behind, and so forth. After November 1944, we haven't had a single political assassination here in Bulgaria. Take Todor Zhivkov, may he rest in peace, and take Ceausescu, who was sentenced in two hours! Even this represents Bulgaria as a part of Europe. It is a country where we solve our problems in a civilised way"* (history teacher, man, Plovdiv, Discussion 2).

"The Psychoanalyse" *"The self-esteem we have is rather shaky. We have had our contributions but we conceive Europe as being regionally determined, economically determined, with set economic, political and cultural borders"* (history teacher, man, Sofia, Discussion 2).

"The Philosopher of History:" *"Undeniably, high culture in the Middle Ages," "political merits for holding up the Arabs and slowing down the Turks;" "we are one of the few civilised countries who have protected their Jews while the German and the French nations were having them*

exterminated, a retarded Balkan country that has acted in a more civilised way than great Germany, as they consider it to be. We have protected them without having Nobel laureates..." (history teacher, man, Sofia, Discussion 1).

Asked to evaluate the school textbooks on European history, the teachers who think of the subject without the "Bulgarian complex" feel that the image of Europe in the textbooks is "*balanced*," that Europe is presented as a "*model with its good and bad sides*," being both "*the generator of new ideas in the Modern Period*" and the face behind the "*selfishness of the Great Powers*."

B. Europe "for us, the Bulgarians"

When we try to bring out the symbolic complex of Europe, it is possible to trace it in two main directions. First of all, by setting off a chain of free associations and thus blocking the reflexive strategies of the participants (in which case Europe appears as some symbolic place, associated mainly with France - the Eiffel Tower, Paris of the 20s, France of the 13th century). Should the participants fall back to reasoning, the totality of Europe that is held up by the symbol disintegrates to pieces ("*history divides them as well*") before being reassembled again into another construct – the present-day Western Europe, personified chiefly by the attained understanding between France and Germany (which is almost invariably pointed out). In that reconstructed entity, however, it is difficult to draw the semantic line between Europe and the West so the two become secretly, as well as openly, identified ("*If we look at the picture realistically, it is striking that all the monuments we mention are from Western Europe*" - history teacher, woman, Sofia, Discussion 1).

Thus the other aspect where the symbol of Europe spontaneously works as a semantic entity is when it is perceived through the prism of our own identity. Then the image of "our disqualification from Europe" becomes activated - that Europe which is conceived as a totality but proves difficult to be semantically distinguished from the notion of "the West" and which in the majority of cases overlaps with the European Union but does not coincide with it. On the other hand, it is insisted that we also belong to that "them."

Within the more numerous group - the one that thinks of Europe through us, the Bulgarians - other three typical constructions were similarly identified. Here, however, a rather specific change of emphasis takes place. If those who perceive Europe more like an autonomous whole and, by taking

a peculiar metastance, manage significantly to overcome the characteristic historical discourse that is so full of **dogmas*** and stereotypes, now, on the contrary, the types of the larger group systematically rest with the dogmas and the cliches that replay and reproduce the national under-Europeisation complex. Europe is viewed first of all - if not merely – as a function, a projection of the hard historical lot Bulgaria and the Bulgarians have drawn not only in the past but in the present as well. (What follows is a very significant consequence in terms of methodology: in the case under discussion the positions become self-typified exactly through the characteristics that Europe is given and not through the mental stylistic apparatus of their actual bearers. We shall underscore that again - that happens because now the dogmas and the cliches have replaced the arguments and act in their stead.) Thus the first typical construction is that of the "guilty Europe;" the second - that of the "shameful Europe," and the third - that of the "distant Europe."

If we must again outline something like a motto for the "guilty Europe" stance, we would choose to quote the words of a Plovdiv teacher: *"let their measure be taken the same way as ours - we aren't worth less by a jot"* (history teacher, man, Plovdiv, Discussion 2).

Europe is now summoned "at the bar:" *"They will never forgive us the fact that Boris - by a combination of circumstances — favoured the Christianisation from Constantinople... I can't imagine I could deceive my students in discussing the after-math of WWI. With the blessing of that great France! (At these words, his voice is deeply embittered and sarcastic.) To ask the emissaries of the Balkan winners – what do your wish, what else could we give you ?! What other piece should we tear apart? That is an image! An image we cannot hide from our students!"* (history teacher, man, Plovdiv, Discussion 2).

We are faced here by a very submissive, passive, and yet strongly committed view - point on Europe, a perspective claiming Bulgaria to be "more Europe" than Europe ("we have been a major factor," "we had outstripped them," "in so many respects we are greater Europeans than they are") and therefore considering the country to be undeservedly neglected: *"We have stood at the source of the transition from Antiquity to the Middle Ages; and with all that strong presence of ours in*

* We shall specifically call attention to the fact that the term should not be charged with the sense of evaluation. In his book entitled *The Structure of the Scientific Revolutions*, Thomas Kuhn describes the period between two scientific revolutions as "normal science," whose discourse is woven by axiomatic propositions functioning as preconceptional forms. These are what he calls "dogmas" (v. Кун, Т. 1996. Структура на научните революции. София)

Europe, it can't be that now Europe is turning us down, they can't kick us out!" (*history teacher, man, Plovdiv, Discussion 2*). We have called this stance submissive as - taken in response to the disqualifying gesture of Europe and full of so much pain and offence, it nonetheless remains stupefied, rigid beyond limit, resistant to any possible action. If anything should and could be done, it must be done exclusively on their part, never on ours. Europe is the subject of all responsibility and guilt.

The motto of the position which has reduced Europe to the "shameful Europe" would look like this: "We know pretty well they're not what they want to pass off for down here!" (*history teacher, woman, Sofia, Discussion 1*). This case reveals a particularly interesting mechanism to deal with the Europe complex. Its underlying desire is to expose Europe, so to say, "in bare panties:" there, look at them, "we know a lot... we know about them, we know what they have been through, what things have happened to them..." (*history teacher, woman, Sofia, Discussion 1*). This is an attempt to peep "through the keyhole." The drive behind it, however, is not a voyeuristic interest; it is the wish to demonstrate at any rate what the "real" Europe "really" looks like - the one that we all so strongly crave for and so uncritically admire. It is by no means what it appears to be since there are hidden, unclean sides to it, as well as intentions ("For, pardon my words, but what we have here is certainly not a purely Bulgarian policy in the economy: it is the attitude of the European Great Powers with respect to Bulgaria" — *history teacher, man, Plovdiv, Discussion 2*). To this end, attention must be coiled to some "dainty details" connected with the history of Europe: "people are washed when they are born and washed when they die. But one English queen took the vow not to get washed until the siege was lifted from the fortress, and the siege was lifted only 3 years later... And those picks they used, the lovely dressed up ladies at the French court, the picks they used to pick the lice out of their coiffeured heads. That is Europe. With the narrow streets where the nightspots were emptied from above in the morning, and where they used to let the pigs out at night to clean up the streets of London;" or on some everyday practices from the European present: "do you know that those phrase-books they sell in France are drawn in French and Portugese so that they can hire housemaids, nannies, cleaners; what shall we be in Europe then - door-keepers, sewage wipers?" (*history teacher, woman, Sofia, Discussion 1*).

"Nothing comes for a song" - that is the motto of the position we have called the "distant Europe." From this point of view, our road to Europe will not be easy, there is a lot to be done. The differences between us and the Europeans are significant enough to make any illusions pointless {"opposite models up there in Europe and down here at home"). On the other hand, Europe takes on the function of something like a "screen," a "mirror" where we recognise our own identity: "With

them, there is this *feeling of common interests, this understanding - that is something they have really done. How has it happened: Europe being one whole thing, both economically and politically, in terms of information as well, in terms of interests. We also must act in such a way as to deserve it one day, the moment when we shall have the right to protect our interests as a whole*" (history teacher, woman, Sofia, Discussion 2).

We would like to draw special attention to one "impossible" mental construct (at least for the unphilosophical mind): since within this group Europe operates as our national complex, the European in the Bulgarian is perceived in the concurrence of the centre and the frontier - we are simultaneously a centre (cultural, civilisational, "the third civilisation in Europe") and a frontier - the "sanitary strip" of Europe, protecting their frontiers. (It is very important to stress that we protect precisely their frontiers, not ours - notwithstanding that at the time we organically belonged to Europe or even stood at its very centre. It can be clearly seen here how the present-day experience of being Bulgarian comes to extrapolate our today's geopolitical coercion to the periphery upon the historical past.) If we proceed to put up in one general picture the arguments that were voiced by the different participants, it would look as follows: precisely because of this ambivalence of the centre and the frontier, Bulgaria has always been an immanent part of Europe but had never had the historical time to consummate her belonging, her "Europeity." And we know whom to blame - the 5 centuries as well as the last 50 years of isolation. Under that calculation, there remain all in all 66 years ("quite a little, isn't it?") for Bulgaria to consummate its intrinsic innerness in the space called "Europe."

It could be maintained that one of the sources of this paradoxicality is the lack of distinction between Europe and the West in the present-day feeling of being driven out, of being peripheral, of otherness and backwardness. It is that feeling and that indistinctness of the Europe-West image that check the autonomous articulation of the notion of Europe and the non-geographical space called Europe, pulling it once to the side of the Western parliamentary and economic model, once to the side of the ingratitude for what we have endured for the sake of those part of whom we are ourselves.

A very significant element of the discourse of the focus groups turned out to be the symptomatic confusion between the "wishful" and the "real" Europe, which proved especially characteristic during the arrangement of the photographic materials. This particular "misunderstanding" of what the experiment they were invited to join was all about, seems hardly incidental. "*Do we take out what we don't like or what doesn't fit in with Europe?*", asked one of the participants in the Sofia focus group. "*A wish or the reality?*", one of the women teachers from the Plovdiv group also

inquired. "*// is one thing if we make the wishful portrait of Europe, but if we picture the Europe of today, of what has already come about...*", a Sofia teacher said in *the tone more of a comment than of a question. Without any fear of exaggeration we would claim that this is actually one of the most basic contradictions, systematically reproduced in the teachers' unconscious; it is a dilemma which, after being stealthily put into action, blocks the possibility for a realistic approach in the attitude towards Europe*: "Some apprehensions are expressed that one modernisation of a Western-European type would extinguish those typically Bulgarian virtues of ours, the ones associated with the Bulgarian Revival... Should we introduce and impose their narrow specialisation model, we will oppose it to that broader general knowledge... Despite the fact that the world tendencies lean exactly in that direction" (*history teacher, Plovdiv*).

Part II
THE STUDENTS

EUROPE AS AN AUTONOMOUS NOTION "IN THE HEADS"

OF THE BULGARIAN HIGH-SCHOOL STUDENTS

1. The Problem

The Europeisation of the history teaching and the multiplication of the cultural capital

During our conversations with the teachers we were constantly encountered by the impossibility for an autonomous notion of Europe to be articulated and held together. Our expectations that we would be unable to free the process of speaking from the expert historical discourse were not justified - in reality it constantly revolved around the gravity centre of the civic position where Europe was again and again conceived through the Bulgarians' national complex for underEuropeisation.

When attention was explicitly focused on Europe as some semantic wholeness, as a totality, it crumbled apart ("history divides them as well") before being reassembled again into another construct - the present-day Western Europe, personified chiefly by the attained understanding between France and Germany (pointed out almost invariantly). In that re-constructed entity, however, it is difficult to draw the semantic line between Europe and the West so the two become secretly identified. The indistinctness of the Europe-West image then checks the autonomous articulation of the idea of Europe and the non-geographical space called Europe, pulling it once to the side of the Western parliamentary and economic model, once to the side of the ingratitude for what we have endured for the sake of those part of whom we are ourselves.

Those teachers who managed to distance themselves from the position of "offence" and to articulate autonomously Europe, stand out with their enhanced cultural capital.

Our preliminary expectations were that significant differences with regard to the image of Europe will be outlined among the students as well - between those from the elite schools and those from the standard high-schools. Surprisingly, however (or maybe just at first glance), that hypothesis was not corroborated.

In contrast with the teachers, the students' replies do not correlate with their cultural capital. Furthermore, although just like their teachers the students reproduce many of the clichés, they seem

unaffected by the offended mentality which rationalises the respective clichés for the teachers, making the historian's *doxa* and the citizen's *doxa* converge.

In other words, if their broader cultural capital is related for the teachers with a capability to become distanced from the offended mentality and autonomously articulate the form "Europe," the students reproduce some of the offended mentality's clichés without actually having that offended mentality; secondly, for the students the autonomous articulation of the form "Europe" is not correlated with their accumulated cultural capital. Therefore, even though there exists solidarity among teachers and students on some clichés regarding the Bulgarians' European identity, they could not communicate, nor engage in a dialogue on the subject as the teachers would see it in the light of a not only historical-educational, but also civic-everyday *doxa*, while the students will apply to it only the historical *doxa*. Although the underEuropeisation of Bulgaria is an everyday patency for the students as well, that everyday patency is constituted in a totally different manner. We suggest that the failure to meet on that common ground is related to the transformation in the reproduction of the cultural capital (a transformation, initiated moreover not from within the actual realm of culture but from the realm of power) and its altered place within the general structure of capitals. For the teachers, the transformation in question - or rather the rapid drop in the cultural capital's value within the total range and structure of the capitals, depicts a biographical collapse where the historical *doxa* on the Bulgarians' European identity becomes coalesced with the everyday patency that we are always being "swindled" by Europe. For the students, on the other hand, the transformation in the reproduction of the cultural capital means that the trajectory between the choice of school and the future slip into predetermined social positions is interrupted, that the connection between the school "title ranks" and the social competencies is cut - yet it is by no means a crisis of the biographical model. Linked with the valuation of the pure economic capital within the general structure of capitals, this explains why the correlation between the students' views and their type of school is so insignificant. The relation between the school and the reproduction of the cultural capital is brought about by the family strategies and the capability of certain schools to translate their "title ranks" into social positions. Not long ago the "secret" of the initiation in the elite schools used to lie in the almost guaranteed acceptance of their alumni in the universities which was in turn highly prestigious, that is, invested with symbolic capital (since the legitimacy of the cultural capital in its own right, unquestionably recognised by the others, makes this capital symbolic). Naturally, later on the story would be continued through the translation of the university "title ranks" into social positions but that is a peripheral issue for the purposes of the current study. The multiplication of the universities and the drawing of only *ad hoc* provisional criteria to measure

their prestigiousness is an event of ambiguous quality: it both indicates and perpetrates the process of reduction of the cultural capital's significance within the general structure of capitals - as the symbolic form of each capital, including the cultural capital, is itself held within certain rites of initiation and inculcation. The rites, however, have been deprived of their symbolic effectivity. (60% of the high-school graduates continue their course of study.) Under these circumstances the very substance of the school capital, if we could so call it, is concentrated in the study of foreign languages viewed not so much a matter of prestige as a value of economic relevance.

On the other hand, the everyday patencies of the teacher and the everyday patencies of the student can hardly be shared - the primary socialisation of the present-day students has taken place through and among too many "western" artefacts: the cable television and the Internet, McDonald's and the unemployment benefits, the mobile phones, the hypermarkets, etc. So while for the teacher all these things are preliminary given by discourse, the student simply takes them for granted and near to hand. The students have been socialised with the satellite channels, the McDonald's specialties and the computer slang, they have them, so to say, "in hand," while their teachers learn all that as if it were a foreign language. As a woman teacher said during the second Sofia discussion: "*...they think they're already in Europe, punching in whatever they need... and they think they are connected. They feel members of one big family, they can get in touch with anyone, but they are critical, they don't buy it all with hurrah-hurray in some kind of euphoria. They don't think that what they find in some of those pages they log on to is that wise and deep, you know.*"

2. The Data

It should be mentioned in this connection that the transformation in the reproduction of the cultural capital and its place in the structure of the capitals was often referred to, in one way or another, by the teachers themselves - e.g. the reform of the secondary education which drastically cut the number of teaching hours per week, the high educational standard demonstrated by the Bulgarian students at international Olympiads, although these same students will be sucked in by some "Hgrade seedy western university" or will end up as the sewage workers and the cleaners of Europe, etc. The cultural attractiveness of Europe in the eyes of the students (according to their teachers) is connected with the opportunities for reproduction of the cultural capital: "*That is what draws them in - that over there, if you have the respective abilities, competencies, if you come off well, your efforts will be rewarded. That is what's so valuable. While down here they don't feel sure they'll have good social prospects*" (woman, Sofia, Discussion 2). Asked about the European associations

of their students, the teachers often mentioned the higher standard of living. What is the answer of the students, however? It is true that to the closed question (with **previously set** alternative answers) *"If you were asked what Europe is, which of the following associations would be your answer?"* not few of them have chosen precisely the *"high standard of living"* - 21%. That comes second, however, to *"the European civilisation and culture,"* which registers 34%. The same is the relatively most frequent answer to the free question: *"When you hear the word Europe, what is the first thing that comes to your mind?"* Yet the association stands not so much for the notion of the "spiritual form called Europe" as for the "civilisedness" of the western daily life itself. It is hardly accidental that, when asked what basic motives could make them embrace an opportunity to live in Western Europe, the students go for *"more opportunities for Jobs and better payment"* (35%) and *"the higher standard of living"* (27%) instead of *"more opportunities to widen your choice and contacts"* or *"more opportunities for better education"* (which have gained only 10% each). That is, the cultural attractiveness of Europe and the European associations of the students are not reflected through the historical knowledge of the "spiritual form called Europe" and the high European culture but through the everyday mental outlooks on the normality of the western daily life. Or, to put it otherwise, the basic students' association about Europe is as a type of everyday life. It is exactly here that we see how the students' patency of Bulgaria's under-Europeisation is constituted in a manner totally different from that of their teachers. If for the teachers it represents an ominous otherness because our Europeisation would mean to denounce what is in us most European, for the students this under-Europeisation is simply a matter of proportion. (Which will perhaps remain the case only until the day when they have to queue up in front of an embassy to get a visa.)

Furthermore, their combined answers to this and two other questions reveal something rather curious. In order to distinguish the different everyday layers within the associations of Europe and the Europeans, we constructed one projective question where the 10 th-graders had to imagine that they were taking part in an international expedition and had to choose partners for work, friendship and fun among Bulgarians, Germans, Americans, Frenchmen, Russians, Britons and Italians. If in terms of working together the Germans and the British get the same percentage as the Bulgarians (44%), they prove to be least favoured for friendship and fun: only 17% of the Bulgarian high-school students prefer Germans for parties and fun, and only 19% would choose British partners; for close friendship, the Germans and the British are even more rarely preferred (13% and 18% respectively). In other words, the association of Europe is linked with its civilisedness perceived not in terms of high culture but rather of the normality of its everyday life. The same normality, however, seen as the specific set of those routine and smoothly running mechanisms that underly one's daily practices, proves to be absolutely foreign in terms of worldview and general life

perception. In order to support with further evidence the thesis that the German and the British civilisedness is not perceived as a culture of the higher examples, we will bring forth the answers to the following question: *"If being German (British) were a profession, what would, it be?"* where the German turns up as a mechanic (subdivided to a technician and a fitter) or a soldier and the Briton - as a politician or a businessman. We will return to this particular question later. Now we will discuss the remaining answers to the projective play question whose aim was to place the association of Europe in different layers of the everyday life. While for working partners the British and the Italians are preferred, chosen for fun and friendship second to the Bulgarians are the Italians - 54% would choose them for parties and fun and 57%, for close friends. Thus closest in terms of their perception of life turn out to be those whom the everyday notion pictures in an attitude of overthrowing from within with havoc and ridicule the normal, civilized daily routine that stands as the students' first association about Europe. As the joke goes, paradise is where the Germans are mechanics, the Britons are policemen, the French are chefs, the Italians are lovers and all are governed by the Swiss. While hell is where the Germans are policemen, the Britons are chefs, the French are mechanics, the Swiss are lovers and they are all governed by the Italians. Brushing the joke aside, however, and looking at the students' associations produced under the associative experiment, had being Italian been a profession, he would be - other than chef, either a mafioso or a man of the arts (singer, actor, musician).

In sum, that which most compactly embodies the civilised daily life as the first association of Europe, is for the students most distant in worldview terms, while what subverts it proves to be closest.

Since one of our hypotheses (suggested by the survey *The Image of the Other in the History Textbooks of the Balkan Countries* which was carried out two years ago) was that the textbook historical knowledge would prove largely peripheral for the teenagers' daily-practical handling of constructs such as "Europe," "European," "Europeans," we included in the questionnaire another associative experiment comprised of two groups of questions. The first required from the 10 th-grade students to imagine that the different nationalities were clothes and fill in the first association that crossed their mind. Under the second group of questions, the nationalities had to be freely associated with professions. Our purpose was to disclose the symbolisations of an "unconscious history" (Bourdieu; cf. Nikolova et al., 1997) operating in two modes - that of the semblance and that of the everyday-practical making. We speak about an "unconscious history" as long as we are dealing with symbolisations based on historical building material which has lost its proper historicism. The experiment also had a secondary objective - to allow a comparison to be made between the image of the Bulgarians and the image of the Europeans, providing, however, that the

European will not be conceived through the prism of the Bulgarian. (That would allow us as well to examine how the Bulgarian regards himself differently when he is placed in the semantic series of his Balkan neighbours and when he sits in the company of Europeans, Americans, Balkaneers - although this falls beyond the scope of the present article.) We will not recount our findings here as they can be seen in the respective section. We will merely try to investigate, by tracing different series of markers, whether some lines of distinction can be drawn between the European and the Western (let it be reminded that they often function indistinctly both for teachers and students), and to follow some specific lines of exclusion from the European/the Western. While processing the data, we first united in one group all clothes of the types skirt, blouse, trousers, pullover, as they all bring on associations of a faceless normalised everydayness. It is interesting that this association fails to come first only in the cases of the American, the Russian, and the Turk. Yet while the American is most often associated with some other "casual" marker (jeans - 21%; T-shirt or sportswear - 17%), the Russian and the Turk are not associated with anything particularly casual: if the Russian were a piece of clothing, he would be a fur coat (18%) and the Turk would be a turban, a fez or chalvar (57%!). It is plain that the Turk is symbolically excluded not only from the European but from the modern cultural space in general, while the Russian seems more to stand at the threshold. Another curious series was outlined as well: associated with underwear, which could be interpreted as laughing through the normal publicity, were the Frenchman, the Italian and the Bulgarian (at 9% each). In the case of the Frenchman and the Italian the association is combined, however, with some sort of formal dress (a suit or a jacket - 11% for the Frenchman and 8% for the Italian; formal evening suit, 8% for the Frenchman), while with the Bulgarian the association supplementing the underwear was the traditional national costume (9%). Therefore we will repeat again our earlier observation on the feeling of worldview closeness precisely with what ridicules from within the routine normal everydayness that is the students' first association of Europe. This time, however, the emphasis must be placed on these two words, "from within," as it is from within that the ridicule becomes self-ridicule, not under-Europeisation.

Quite characteristically, that feeling of under-Europeisation breaks through with the profession associations. If being Bulgarian had been a profession, the Bulgarian would have been a hired hand, a carrier (8%), unemployed (7%) or an agricultural worker (6%). What is so interesting is the fact that while the teachers are afraid of this being the fate of their students after Bulgaria's political Euro-integration, the students see it rather as a sign of the country's present backwardness. We will bring it to mind again that for the teachers our European identity is symbolised by some higher examples, higher "achievements," that are, however, rather irrelevant with regard to our future integration in the current political structures in Europe. (It seems that the teachers who possess

lower cultural resources consider us much more European while we remain on the outside of political Europe and less so when we start fulfilling the integration criteria.) For the students, on the other hand, for whom Europe is first of all a type of everyday existence, the associations of the Bulgarian with a workman, unemployed or an agricultural worker implicitly define the Bulgarian daily life as being under-Europised and even under-modernised. (For more details on the topic, see the next section of the article.)

Can some distinctive lines be drawn in the students' notions between the European and the Western? We attempted to find the answer by comparing the European and the American. It is worth noting that by using different symbolisations the students reveal different layers of some "unconscious history" within the European space itself. (We should bear in mind that under the methodology of the associative experiment it is supposed that the nationalities are the signified but after being ascribed their attributes, they become signifiers as well.) First comes the layer of the formal representative publicity, personified most compactly by the Englishman - as a piece of clothing, he would have been a dinner-jacket, a tail-coat (13%) or a suit (13%), while as a profession he would have been a politician or a diplomat (8%). It is in this layer that the image of the European is most distinctly differentiated from that of the American. The other layer of the European is that of the disciplinary daily routine, personified by the German - had he been some kind of dress, he would have been a military uniform (12%), while seen as a profession, apart from being a mechanic or a technician; he would have been a soldier, a military man (8%). This image couples the outlook of the disciplinary habitus of a particular type of daily life with that of the recent European history as a history of violence (the answers to another question bring out the First and the Second World Wars as being most emblematic for Europe during the modern and the recent times). The third layer was already drawn up in the quite artistic images of the Frenchman and the Italian.

The associative experiment has clearly demonstrated that the association of the summary image of the European as a businessman (31%), most frequently pointed out (under another, closed question), falls apart into different cultural and habitual layers. Furthermore, the association with a businessman would definitely fit better the American (23%) than any European. Which proves that in their mechanics, as objective structures of the normalised everyday life, the European and the Western are difficult to discern for the 10 th-grade students. The distinction between them, however, is clear-cut at the level of the habituses and the mentalities which inhabit that everydayness and warm it with life.

EUROPE AND THE BULGARIAN NATIONAL COMPLEX IN THE NOTIONS OF THE PRESENT-DAY TEENAGERS

To what extent the second and actually dominating semantic context into which the teachers conceive the "Europe" theme - namely, that of "Europe of the disqualifying and rejecting glance" - can be found in today's teenagers' minds? At stake is one such vitally important constituent of the national identity as is the look upon one-self "through the eyes of Europe;" so have they unequivocally taken on the legacy they have been passed, unspared of the national under-Europeisation complex? Or, being socialised under rather different socio-cultural conditions, the teenagers show signs of a national self-esteem of a different type that should undoubtedly influence the way they think about "Europe" and the "European?" Are there symptoms of a generation rift in this respect?

Before proceeding to discuss the findings that would put us on the track to the possible answers to these questions, let us consider one structural peculiarity of the teaching of history (that has been repeatedly pointed out in our research papers), namely:

1. The Problem

The Hidden School Programme (for "Europeisation")

The matter in question is the so-called hidden school programme which, in contrast with the overt syllabus, transmits to the students not explicit factual knowledge, historical assessments and opinions but inapparent, inexplicit, inarticulate models of thinking, thus teaching them not so much the things' "whatness" as what "like" these things are thought of. The hidden school programme is not identical with the educationalist's position (undoubtedly different from that of the teacher as an expert) as whole layers of the educationalist's position may well be just as unapparent to him himself. Elements of the hidden school programme that is implanted in the textbooks on Bulgarian history are, for instance, the perception of czar Ferdinand not as a statesman but as a psychological type or that of the Greeks not as Greeks but as non- Bulgarians* (this being an unconscious technique to reduce the complicity and attain a "more economical" symbolic efficacy of the narrative or of the historical assessment). Within the context presently under discussion, and since we have established that the teachers tackle the notion of Europe as some semantic entity, as a totality, we believe that some hidden school programme for Europeisation can be claimed to run

* See Deyanov 1995: 136.

through the entire school course of instruction in history. That hidden school programme is no doubt a resultant of many different, even controversial ideological influences. We have, on the one hand, the influence of the official historical discourse which, in line with the "political dream" of post-communist Bulgaria, namely its integration in "Europe," over the last decade has been setting as a global objective of the teaching of history the inscription of the Bulgarian history into the European history as its organic part (cf. *The Methodological Guidelines of the Ministry of Education* from 1992 onward). On the other hand, there is the tradition into which the Bulgarian teachers have socialised themselves (one of the interviewed participants even demonstrated the need to explicitly emphasise that tradition, describing himself as *"a graduate of the Sofia University, of Ilcho Dimitrov, I am a nationalist in the best positive sense of the word"* - Plovdiv, Discussion 2) - different generations of textbooks may come and go every other couple of years, but that is not the case with the Bulgarian teachers! Then comes the residence among the images of the present that are flashing at us from the media in a reflection of the widespread mass frustration from the unfulfilled "political dream." And last but not least in importance, there is that anticipated remodelling of the personal identity brought about by the multimedia revolution, part of which the teenagers have already become, while for the older generations it remains an experience beyond reach. (Even though that development is interpreted with some good irony, the rift is easy to feel - *"...they think they're already in Europe, punching in whatever they need... and they think they are connected. They feel members of one big family, they can get in touch with anyone, but they are critical, they don't buy it all with hurrah-hurray in some kind of euphoria. They don't think that what they find in some of those pages they log on to is all that wise and deep, you know"*; (woman teacher, Sofia, Discussion 2). All the above are simply some of the currents running within the larger process of redefining the national identity, where the history teachers are, so to say, functionaries in the front line. Faced with the necessity to produce meaning by linking in coherent chains the facts from the past and the present, the teachers are busy with a continuous quest for "signs" in the Bulgarian and the European history - signs both of our belonging to Europe and of Europe's coming near (or sliding down) to us. It is that - often arbitrary, improvised, biographically coloured - overemphasising of periods and events from the Bulgarian and the European history which are attributed with special value as a sign of common affiliation, that accounts for the hidden school programme in the teaching of history.

The structure of that hidden school programme can be isolated out of the pedagogical discourse mainly when the teachers talk about the perceptions of their students without being explicitly asked to do so. To come to terms with the students' point of view, with the students' (lack of) knowledge, is basically the dynamic element of the teaching practice which opens its free territories and stimulates its inventiveness. Since through the students' (lack of) knowledge the teachers meet with another reality, slipping out of their control - the cultural examples drawn from the media, the family, the friends, etc., that encounter provokes either their expertise in the discipline they teach, or their institutional role in general. How they move in that border territory, in that "zone of insecurity" (P. Bourdieu)* - whether they actively set foot in it or retreat with a sense of helplessness (refusing

to make any comments), what are their schemes of interpretation when the buttress of their professional knowledge has given way (whether they remain at the schemes of the common sense or apply some more specialised humanitarian knowledge), proves decisive for the hidden school programme underlying their teaching. In this sense, the hidden school programmes for Europeisation are local - unlike the official historical discourse of the textbooks (the overt syllabus), they depend entirely on the teacher's and students' mentality as they together produce one local procedure of training.

Let us follow the workings of the above mechanism on the example of the "serial" references of one of the interviewed teachers with regard to her students' perceptions. Where - even though euphemistically - elements of a local hidden school programme appear, the respective phrase will be given in bold type.

"The students don't include the Czech Republic or Hungary in Europe, neither Slovakia. That separation/or 50 years has had its say. Russia is ours, the one that is always right behind us. That is our space."

"When the characteristics of the political system are discussed, the students are rather critical actually — what do they want from us, their constitutions also have their limitations. After the Revolution France had a new Constitution every couple of months, while the one that is most conservative is that of the United States."

"So far the Balkans are associated in the students' notions with Balkan mores, Balkan mentality, which is not very flattering indeed- constant squabbles, moves behind the scenes, this was inherited from the Ottoman Empire and the ways in which all these countries have gained their independence. The historical examples in this respect aren't very favourable. (...) On the one hand, they can feel it, that sort of Balkan identity, the dark Balkan subject, that sort of thing, but, on the other hand, they can make the difference - the fact the Turkey can be better trusted than Greece since the Byzantines have always been so false to us, then the example -with the Phanariots. As for the Serbs, the attitude towards them is pretty often something like - we've always beaten them hard, what are they thinking playing big now, ah? It was very negative towards Romania during the time of the Balkan Wars... the perfidious Romania, and they forget that the country took part in the Russian-Turkish War... "
(excerpts from Discussion 2 in Sofia)

* The famous French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu defines the general principle of the functioning of these zones and the occupations that fall within them, as follows: The very definition of these ill defined, ill delineated, ill secured posts is paradoxically based on the freedom that is left to their occupants to define and set their borders, bringing along with absolute freedom their own definitions, the entire embodied necessity which is constituent of their habituses. These positions will be what the ones occupying them are, or at least those among them who - in the inside "struggles" of their trade or in the clashes with the other related or competitive professionals - manage to impose a definition of what they are." (P. Bourdieu, 1998)

This upholding of the students' point of view serves as a (half-conscious) tactics allowing the "legitimate" skirting of the official historical discourse and the break-up of space for other intimations. Even the first statement euphemistically alludes to the neglecting of the history of socialism (*"what you have in the textbook after 1944 isn't history at all,"* another teacher said) where the roots of our present situation are buried. (The interesting fact is that the survey data from the students hardly corroborate the teacher's statement - 71% of the interviewed include the Central European countries within "the real borders of Europe.") The second statement is apparently an expression - through the voice of the students - of the massively felt pressure exercised upon us from "Europe," the resistance against which is clad in historical arguments. What becomes clear from the third case is that the teacher would never take it upon herself to criticise the common prejudice against our neighbours (with a single cautious exception) as, according to her, such preconceptions are based on sufficient historical grounds. (Again, the data from the students' survey show that according to 75% of the interviewed students in recent times Turkey has played a negative role for the history of Bulgaria.)

2. The Data

In the students' questionnaire, several series of questions were included to cover the different levels at which the Bulgarian identity through "the eyes of Europe" is constituted - the level of the official statehood (the privileged subject of the historical discourse); the level of the Bulgarian people's national features (the mentalities), and the level of the personal identity of the interviewed (his/her biographical self-evident facts). The objective here was to outline the image of Europe (respectively the Europeans) in the negative, so to speak: as a sanctionative look which either grants or refuses us recognition. Our hypotheses were constructed along the following lines: (i) a certain dissonance, manifest in discrepant self-images in the above-mentioned three levels and expressing the so extensively outspoken lack of awareness of a "common interest," of a civic set of mind, of one specifically Bulgarian quasiindividualism; (ii) an ambiguous identity of "Europe" which is perceived once as the "Great Powers" at whose hand we are (have been) merely a puppet on a string, and once as an ideal of values. Generally, these hypotheses came to be justified.

In order to discover the teenagers' self-perception operative at the first level, we set forth a number of propositions that articulated the typical teachers' messages under the hidden school programme for Europeisation. In them, the Bulgarian identity is viewed tantamount to the official statehood and Europe - to the "political" Europe. (The propositions are not mutually preclusive since that corresponds to the very style of thinking of that *ad hoc* knowledge we have called compensative historical knowledge.)

The proposition that was met with greatest consensus by the interviewed students was that *"We have always been ignored and damaged by Europe"* - it gathered 72% acceptance and only 11% disagreement. The result is fully concordant with the dominant teachers' message, thus presenting an

evidence for the existence of a settled national prejudice in this respect where a serious generation break can hardly be expected in the future. The "Great Powers" from the school textbooks automatically turn into the persistent image of "political" Europe, while the present (democratic?) pan-European institutions remain deeply overshadowed by their heavy historical ghost. Which doubtless illustrates the "long time" of the educational tradition that no political programme for European integration can afford not to consider.

When the same prejudice is deconstructed according to our activity or passivity with regard to that policy, a rather interesting result comes up: the two logically preclusive propositions "*// is mostly up to us whether Bulgaria will become part of Europe*" and "*// depends exclusively on the interests of the West whether Bulgaria will become part of Europe,*" are supported respectively by 67% and 55% of the teenagers, that is, they practically do not operate as controversial. Clearly evident here is the logic of the double identity resulting, firstly, from the perception of Europe as the Europe of the values that grants recognition to one's efforts, and, secondly, from its perception along the logic of the policy of interests where Bulgaria has always suffered damage. Such double identities are basically a symptom of an undermined everyday belief in the picture of the world.

There is one point where the teenagers demonstrate significant discord with their educators: it is with regard to the almost mythological picture among the teachers that in the Middle Ages - in the words of a 24-year old woman teacher from Sofia - we were "*number 1 in Europe,*" something which is crucially important today. Among the students, only 33% agree that "*In the Middle Ages, Bulgaria was at the centre of Europe so we are much more Europeans than some other European countries;*" 32% disagree with that proposition and other 32% can not form an opinion. Thus the new generation - being free from a traumatised historical mentality - becomes itself a corrective agent to the mythological leanings of its educators.

Yet, how is the "European" conceived of in our history, that is, what is that standard, that norm, independent of all factualities, against which we are anyhow forced to measure our past and our present? Undoubtedly, if the teachers are able to conceptualize more or less successfully the respective scale of "Europeity" (the European being a kind of "model") and to measure rationally our deviations from ("falling behind," etc.) and approximations to it, it would be logical to expect that the students would have a rather vague idea of that scale as applied to history. What do the findings tell? Asked to judge to what extent some key events in the Bulgarian history "characterize us as Europeans," the 10 th-grade students have demonstrated consensus on the following: such are the embracement of Christianity (which characterizes us as Europeans for 87% of the students), the creation of the Slavonic alphabet (87%), the National Revival (84%), the salvation of the Jewry (74%), the peaceful transition to democracy after 1989 (74%) and the sustained ethnic peace after 1989. These are evidently the dogmas - in the sense of unquestionable common places - of the official post-1989 historical and political discourse. Placed at the contrary, "non-European" pole are, as follows: the authoritarian regimes of the 30s (for 55% of the interviewed students) and the socialistic industrialization (40%). Rather interesting as well is the list of those events that the students have found difficult to mark as a sign of the European or the non-European: these are

mainly the September events of 1923 (unclear for 64% of the students), the Leipzig trial (unclear for 51 %) and the Bogomil movement (unclear for 45%). Without overvaluing such a snapshot of the students' minds, we cannot read it otherwise but as a symptom of a serious confusion in the sphere of the historical assessments. Here again the teenagers' answers are nothing but a litmus for the contradictiveness and the ambivalence of the school textbook messages. It is plain that these messages divest the high-school students from a perceptive sense for the neutral in terms of value, "objective" history. For instance, when they classify without difficulty and with consent the saving of the Jewry as "European," but are confused at the Leipzig trial and the September events of 1923, that is apparently a projection of the still politicised historical assessments of the inter-war period called in service not so much of the historical objectivity as of the delegitimisation of a particular modern-day political community. The qualification of the authoritarian regimes of the 30s as a non-European phenomenon most emphatically exhibits the fusion of the notion of Europe with an ideal set of values. So it paradoxically turns out that in the students' minds precisely the historical criterion by which the Bulgarian history can be seen as part of the European is overcharged with values and is actually dominated by today's official political discourse. That makes the historical knowledge an abstract quantity, shutting up history in a world of its own where it can hardly assist one's practical orientation in the contemporary reality.

At the same time the 10 th-grade students feel far from wanting in their practical knowledge of the present-day "European standards." When they have to estimate to what extent the various sectors of the country's life "approximate the European standards," only single ones (up to 13%) find that difficult to do. In their opinion, most non-European in quality are our standard of living, our ecology, the health care system and the economy, while fully or partly commensurate with the European standards are our science, education, sports, culture and art. Again, we are faced here with another paradoxical construct - what is daily most closest, "most at hand" for everyone of us (the civilisation) is non-European, while what is remote - the higher levels of culture both in the past and the present - is European!

This brings us to another issue, the self-perception of the young Bulgarians at the level of mentalities. In their view, our most characteristic features are "trickery" (according to 84% of the interviewed students) and "selfishness" (according to 71 %), while those of the Europeans are first of all "initiative" (80%), "self-confidence" (71%) and "broad cultural resources" (69%). In other words, in the case of the Bulgarian we are dealing with the mentality of survival, in the case of the European - with the mentality of creativity and accumulation. Even if this self-evaluation is slightly ironic, it adds intensity to the break-up between the notions of our abstract "Europeity" on the higher levels of culture and the sharply felt "un-Europeity" of our daily life.

Thus in the heads of today's high-school students - not too painfully at that – there coexist two different standards, two norms of the European. At one end, there stands the historical standard, eternally transfixed by the ambivalent figure of Europe seen once as the Europe of interests that "has always ignored and damaged us," and once as the Europe of the democratic values, measured against which our history appears to be a deviation or a retardation. Owing to this ambivalence, the

historical standard becomes vague, confusing and practically inefficient.

In the cases where the teenagers experience no difficulties to rank some event in the Bulgarian history as being European, what is actually at work are the cliches of today's official political discourse. In this respect the historical standard which is set down by education in fact fails to support the justification of the present-day picture of the world. Which explains why with the students (in contrast with some of their educators) it can not engage in the production of mythological constructs.

Standing at the other end is the contemporary everyday standard of the European which - albeit presenting us in a light that is not that decent - holds out for the teenagers greater potential for self-knowledge.

CONCLUSION

FOR A COMMUNICATIVE MODEL IN SCHOOL

We will proceed to present a rather interesting vision on the "history textbook of the newest type," specifically relevant to the issues examined under the current survey. In the form of preliminary statement we will say that this vision is part of a larger context which understands education as a process based on communicative strategies, equal standing of all positions and dialogue - an idea presently being elaborated by some colleagues from Novosibirsk. In the passages to follow, we will be drawing on Troizkii and Privalova's article "Istoria v shkole: obrazovatel'nyi potentsial uchebnikov novogo tipa" (*History at School: the Educational Potential of the New Type Textbooks*), published in the Discourse magazine, 5/6, 1998.

According to the authors of the concept, the tone and the pathos of the traditional schoolbooks preclude all doubts and the student is left with nothing else but to assimilate agreeingly whatever is written in the textbook. The purpose of this type of historical education is to provide almost exclusively factual knowledge, while the domain of judgement and opinion is reduced to ideological schemes. By offering only ready-made knowledge, the traditional textbook chokes any possibility for a responsive, different opinion. The authors then introduce the term "communicative potential" of the textbook, denoting by it the "set of all possible variants and units of the communicative process that are thereby supplied." Chief place in the new school- book should be given not to the factual information but to its various and multifarious interpretations - set out at that not by the author of the textbook but in their own authentic being to preserve their original "voice" and "pitch." In other words, opinions should prevail over knowledge. (As even that knowledge which is neutrally laid out holds an element of interpretation.) Such a vision is based on the presumption that there exists something like a historiographical myth implying that facts and interpretations are fused in one coherent fabric - a myth, generated through the illusion that the historian deals with events, not with texts about these events. Or, to quote Lotman, the language of the document becomes identified with the document itself.

The new schoolbook discourse, the authors claim, should take the shape of a documentary-historiographical complex, arranged in accordance with certain rules and equipped with a system of questions and answers. Set at its core should be the historical event, immanently controversial even in its very status as such. The second element should be the so-called historiographical contradiction - selected are relevant texts on the topic produced by different historians and standing as much apart in their evaluation and manner of analysis as possible. The collected package of texts should also present different ways of encoding identical historical information, that is, the texts should vary in genre and style. Hence, the rule of the "three contradictions" can be formulated - the event-related, the historiographical and the semiotic contradictions that build the construct in question. It will permit the school dialogue through the availability of different but potentially equally valid versions. This type of schoolbook discourse rules out the simple assimilation. Any attempt at the mechanical acceptance of one of the suggested standpoints would render all the other ones impossible as they would fall out of the picture. The only way left open to the student would be to take a meta-position, that is, to author a version of his own, necessarily taking into consideration all the other versions. His would be then a specific, responsible position, made even more serious by the requirement to be laid down in writing (as long as the written text is an executed and therefore irreversible action). In the schoolbook construct proper, a special place would be set aside for that particular text so that without it, the whole would appear incomplete, unperfected.

Thus the schoolbook construct would open up positions for three roles: that of the events' contemporary (the annalist, the chronicler, the eye-witness); that of the heir (the historian, the writer or the student himself); and that of the foreigner (the pilgrim, the trader, the voyager, the diplomat). The participant's position is "hot" since he is also called upon to play his part, unwitting of how the collisions he has been involved in would be resolved in the end. The heir's position is that of the distant observer, recounting the events after they have come to an end. And the position of the foreigner is that of amazement and comparison. (Juxtaposed with all these serious roles is that of the "jester" - a kind of comic pull-down of the serious history that puts on, depending on the epoch and the culture, the mask either of the travelling actor or that of the giber, the joker or the comedian.)

As a first step, the student must adequately grasp the texts included in the documentary-historiographical complex. Next comes the comparison between the documents and the historiographical accounts. Finally, the student is invited to put forth his own version that has taken into account all the above "testimonies." Another important point - the performance evaluation will now be made not along the lines of "wrong/right" but against the scale "convincing/unconvincing version." What is the most important thing here? That in this situation **the teacher is a bearer of a unique authorial position just like everyone of his students, and they stand on equal footing in this.**

Should we come to think of it, precisely the discourse of Europe could undergo this sort of experiment. Why?

Firstly, after 1989 the Bulgarian daily life has been, so to say, steeped in the Europising discourse.

Bulgaria's Europeisation is not only without alternative politically, but - having become irrevocably imbedded in the common people's existence - it has also obtained practical verity. It is not an undertaking of expertise but some- thing dissolved in the realm of opinion. Moreover, as we have established, when they formulate their views on the topic of "Europe," even the teachers set to do so chiefly by way of their civic visions, which they - undoubtedly — professionally dress in the discourse of their expert historical knowledge. The historical problem called "Europe" is not repositied in the past, it is not dead and, therefore, objectified item of analysis. It lives here and now, its history is "being written" in the present, it is still in the process of happening. Faced with the necessity to produce meaning by linking in coherent chains the facts from the past and the present, the teachers are busy with a continuous quest for "signs" in the Bulgarian and the European history — signs both of our belonging to Europe and of Europe's coming near (or sliding down) to us. It is that - often arbitrary, improvised, biographically coloured - overemphasizing of periods and events from the Bulgarian and the European history, which are attributed with special value as a sign of common affiliation, that accounts for the hidden school programme in the teaching of history.

On the other hand, although just like their teachers the students reproduce many of the clichés, they seem unaffected by the offended mentality which rationalises these clichés for the teachers, practically merging in one the historian's doxa and the citizen's doxa despite their - strictly logically speaking - contradictiveness. The everyday patencies of the teacher and the everyday patencies of the student can hardly be shared - the primary socialisation of the present-day students has taken place through and among too many "western" artefacts: the cable television and the Internet, McDonald's and the unemployment benefits, the mobile phones, the hypermarkets, etc. So while for the teacher all these things are preliminary given by discourse, the student simply takes them for granted and near to hand. The students have been socialised with the satellite channels, the McDonald's specialties and the computer slang, they have them, so to say, "in hand," while their teachers learn all that as if it were a foreign language. Therefore, even though there exists solidarity among teachers and students on some cliches regarding the Bulgarians' European identity, they could not communicate, neither engage in a dialogue on the subject as the teachers would see it in the light of a not only historical-educational, but also civic-everyday doxa, while the students will apply to it only the historical doxa. That brings about the crisis of the communicative rationality at schools with respect to the discourse on "Europe" - a crisis which makes that discourse virtually inefficient.

The same crisis, however, holds out the chance for change - from a normative to a communicative model of teaching and identity formation. The vision of a new type of history textbook that has been elaborated in the present article describes a technology of knowledge which, independently of all particular positions that are mirrored in it to see each other, would force all preconceived images to call to question and challenge one another. It is a technique which does not substitute one meta-narrative with another, which does not forcefully straighten the individual biographical experience according to the dogmas of that official meta-narrative but – by affording the capability to switch between various other viewpoints in one didactics of imagination -justifies both the veracity and the limitation of every such individual experience.

Bibliography:

1. Bourdieu, P. 1998. *The dead-which catches the living* (unpublished translation by B. Dimitrova, kept in the Archive of the Institute for Critical Social Studies).
2. Deyanov, D. 1995. *The Textbooks of History and the Commonplaces of Memory*. In: "The Rewritings of the Recent Bulgarian History in the High-School Textbooks," a publication of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, Sofia.
3. Deyanov, D. 1997. *The State and the Commonplaces of Memory*. *Archive*, 3/4.
4. Kuhn, T. 1996. *The Structure of the Scientific Revolutions*. *Sofia*.
5. Nikolova, N., Sv. Subeva, M. Yakimova, M. Kanushev. 1997. *A Symbolic Topology of the Balkans*. *Sociological Issues*, 3/4.
6. *The Rewritings of the Recent Bulgarian History in the High-School Textbooks*, a publication of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, Sofia, 1995.
7. *Guidelines for the Organisation of the Teaching of History in the Secondary Comprehensive and Vocational Schools for the School Year 1997/98*. Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, Sofia, 1997.